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Child Labor and Schooling in a Low Income Rural Economy

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" n_p " n_s ,⁴
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$$u_i = u_i(c_m, c_f, h_s; z_i) \quad i = m, f \quad =/?$$

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$$h_s = h(l_{ss}, b; s) \quad =. ?$$

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⁴ We can think of a period in this model as the time span from birth of a child until the child is of school-age. The number of pre-school children, n_p , can be thought as the fertility outcome for each period,

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$$y = y(l_{ym}, l_{yf}, n_s l_{ys}; h_m, h_f, \dots) = (?)$$

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$$c + p_n(n_p + n_s) + p_b(n_s h_s) = m + p_y y + i_m(h_m l_{wm} + i_f(h_f l_{wf})) \quad = \$?$$

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$$= (n_p + l_{ym} + l_{wf}) \quad = 9?$$

$$= l_{yf} + l_{wf} \quad =>?$$

$$= (n_s + n_p + l_{ss} + l_{ys}) \quad = E?$$

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$$c + p_n(n_p + n_s + p_b(n_s h_s = m + p_y y + \dots_m(h_m l_{wm} + \dots_f(h_f l_{wf}$$

$$y = y(l_{ym}, l_{yf}, n_s l_{ys}; h_m, h_f, \dots; h_s = h(l_{ss}, b; s$$

$$l_{js} = l_{js}(n_p, n_s, s, z_m, z_f, h_m, h_f, \dots, m, \dots, = s, y \quad =)?$$

$$l_{js} = l_{js}(n_p, n_s, s, z_m, z_f, h_m, h_f, \dots, m, \dots, = s, y \quad =/' ?$$

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¹⁰ Chiappori et al. (1998), for example, make use of the relative sex ratio as a proxy for the situation in the marriage market.

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$$\frac{\left[\frac{\partial u_m}{\partial h_s} \frac{\partial h_s}{\partial l_{ss}} \right] + \left(- \left[\frac{\partial u_f}{\partial h_s} \frac{\partial h_s}{\partial l_{ss}} \right] \right)}{\left[\frac{\partial u_m}{\partial c_i} \right] + \left(- \left[\frac{\partial u_f}{\partial c_i} \right] \right)} = p_y n_s \frac{y}{l_{ss}} + p_b n_s \frac{h_s}{l_{ss}} \equiv \cdot_s \quad =/.?$$

¹¹ In the unitary model, for example, all that matters is total income and not its intra-household distribution (i.e. income pooling hypothesis).

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¹⁸ Of those children combining school and work, all but two report school as their primary activity.

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$$l_s = 1 \text{ if } l_s^* > \mu_s, 0 \text{ otherwise} \quad = / 9?$$

$$l_w = 1 \text{ if } l_w^* > \mu_w, 0 \text{ otherwise} \quad = / >?$$

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²¹ It is likely that parents do not report their children as working if the number of hours worked is low. As long as this threshold level of hours of work (μ_w) is the same for all households, (5.4) would be simply replaced by $l_w = 1$ if $l_w^* > \mu_w$, 0 otherwise, without affecting the results. However, if some parents deliberately misreport (i.e. they do not report the child to be working even when hours worked by the child is above μ_w), the resulting coefficient estimates are inconsistent (see Hausman *et al.* 1998). Despite its potential relevance, this issue will not be further explored in this paper.

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³⁵ The wage equation for mothers, however, is not estimated very precisely.

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Significance levels in parenthesis. Tests of unitary preferences are Wald test of joint significance. Tests of Pareto efficiency are non-linear Wald tests of equality of the ratio of effects of each pair of distributional factors across the school and work equations.

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The estimated correlation between the work intensity probit and the work participation probit, ρ , is not significant, indicating that there is no selection bias.

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Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the variables, and represent percentage changes in the relevant probability resulting from a unit increase in the relevant variable (1% increase in the case of credit).

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